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Abstract 
The present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between tax level and 
political stability by using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among 
government effectiveness, corruption, and GDP. For the purpose, we used the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) approach in the panel framework, using a country-level panel data from 
59 countries for the period 2002 to 2008.  
The salient features of this model are: (a) simplicity is based on a limited number of variables 
(five) are categorical or continuous and not dependent on complex interactions or nonlinear 
effects. (b) accuracy: a low level of errors, the model achieves a high percentage of accuracy in 
distinguishing countries with inclination to political instability, compared to countries with 
political stability, (c) generality: the model allows to distinguish types of political instability, both 
resulting from acts of violence and failure of democracies to show, and (d) novelty: the model 
incorporates a tool that helps evaluate and exclude many variables used by the conventional 
literature. This approach is mainly based on the recognition of state structures and the relations 
between elites and parties.  
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 1. Introduction  
 
There is no doubt that any change in political area has strong implications in the socio-
economical systems. Bussiere and Multer (2000) see the political instability trough some factors, 
such as: the political polarization in the parliament; the coalition governments; the undecided 
voters and fickleness of the voters; and the control and timing of the elections. As Hendry (2001) 
notes, the changes in legislation, with sudden modify of economic policy and severe political 
turmoil, cause large “shocks or\breaks” in the economy. 
 
Both the stability and instability can have different manifestations of civil wars or violent 
conflicts, democratic setbacks, few guarantees for human rights groups, violation of trade unions, 
massacres, forced displacement, violent little state presence in regional geography. Reports of 
Freedon House (1972 to 2011) show that these are factors that have greater relevance to the 
future. Even in the wide area of Eastern Europe, some Latin American countries, regimes are 
semi-consolidated authoritarian. 
 
According to Weingast (2009), changes in these old regimes are transformations that affect the 
political institutions, involving sudden changes in the central, replacement and emergency powers 
of local governments, in some cases radical authoritarian and undemocratic. A majority of 
adverse changes in these regimes tend to favour some democracies and, conversely, promote 
authoritarianism. The scale of transformation in the countries that were under the government of 
the Soviet Union is an example of this. The same happens in other regions when the central 
authority collapsed state, as in the cases of Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
during the 1990s, the overthrow of the radical revolution in Cuba in 1959 in Iran in 1979, the 
dissolution of the Confederate States, or demands for secession of the state by extrajudicial 
means, as happened in the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1991, Pakistan in 1972. Venezuela is a case 
of unstable political system, whose systems of government evolved from a political party system 
with an excessive concentration of power to an authoritarian government run by one person. 
 
Kalyvas (2006) considers that the political instability may relate to violent conflicts of low 
intensity. Types of government coalitions with paramilitary groups in rural areas, displacing 
people and expropriate land from its owners. For Estrada (2010) levels of violence vary from 
massacres against the opposition political groups to assassinations of presidential candidates as in 
Colombia during the late 90s. No need to use extreme violence, a political regime can sacrifice 
union leaders or opposition parties. In paramilitary massacres objectives can be derived from 
regional struggles over land, in other cases by animosities against opportunism and conflicts 
within a community. Colombia and Rwanda, in opinion of Kalyvas (2006), are an appropriate 
example of these manifestations of political instability, military regimes in Latin America during 
the 80 years separating the enemies of the opposition, condemning their people and their 
households. In Central America the violent conflict committed against the civilian population 
became an authoritarian regime by a revolutionary government, but its development was a 
continuation of extreme violence by paramilitary groups against specific groups of civilians. 
 
Social movements can lead to revolutionary changes such as Egypt, bloodless extraordinary. The 
transition does not mean a leap toward democracy but toward hybrid forms of government. 
However, massacres, assassinations and forced displacement almost always directly affect the 
political stability of a country. Furthermore, political instability promotes a fragmented image of 
internal conflicts, separate different actions of organized violence, insurgent struggle, forced 
displacement and violence. The challenge is to unify these manifestations of civil violence in the 
formation of a complex domain of political instability. When many events overlap as in the case 
of countries in Africa and Latin America, we detect relationships among the first acts of violence 
and the terminal stage of it. 
 
There are some researches that see the political factors in significant connection with the tax 
level. Melo (2011), for example, identifies many taxation determinants: the levels of economic 
development and GDP per capita, the tax handles, the tax morale, and the political regimes.  
Even if the literature is relatively poor regarding the relationship between tax level and political 
stability, there are two main different directions regarding the results of this connection: (a) the 
level of taxation determines the political stability (Feng, 1997; Devereux and Wen, 1998; Bell, 
2001; Palan, 2002; Carmignani, 2003; Collier, 2009a, 2009b; Ghura and Mercereau, 2004; 
Nkurunziza, 2005; Elgin, 2010; and Estrada, 2011); and b) the political stability determines the 
level of taxation (Cukierman et al., 1992; Volkerink and De Haan, 1999; Bohn, 2002; Aizenmana 
and Jinjarak, 2008; Azzimonti, 2010; Melo, 2011; and Rieth, 2011). 
 
In this paper we use the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach in the panel framework (i.e., we 
used Panel Vector Autoregression, hereafter PVAR) to investigate the biunivoque relationship 
between tax level (Tax) and Political Stability (PS). This choice overcomes and isolates the 
response of Tax to PS and fundamental factors. Use of PVAR approach has advantages in that it 
assumes all variables as endogenous and hence, contrary to the previous studies makes us to 
overcome the defining the dependent variable for which there is there is no consensus among 
researchers. Further, in this connection we focus on the orthogonalized impulse-response 
functions, which show the response of one variable of interest (i.e., Tax) to an orthogonal shock 
in another variable of interest (i.e., PS and other economic variables used in analysis as control 
variables). By orthogonalizing the response, we are able to identify the effect of one shock at a 
time, while holding other shocks constant. 
We use country-level panel data from 59 countries for the period 2002 to 2008 to study the 
dynamic relationship between Tax and PS. Our main interest is to study whether the dynamics of 
tax revenue are different across countries with different levels of political stability. 
 
We argue that the level of PS in a country can be used as an indication of the different degrees of 
economic constraints faced by a country either due to economic or non-economic reasons. After 
controlling for the shocks to ‘fundamental’ factors, we interpret the response of ‘Tax’ to ‘PS’ as 
evidence of economic constraints and we expect this response to be larger in countries with lower 
levels of PS. We believe that our paper contributes to a number of strands in the recent fiscal 
economics literature. First, by using vector autoregressions on panel data we are able to consider 
the complex relationship between Tax and the PS of countries, while allowing for a country-
specific unobserved heterogeneity in the levels of the variables (i.e., fixed effects). Second, by 
analyzing orthogonalized impulse-response functions we are able to separate the response of Tax 
(tax burden) to shocks coming from fundamental or economic and non-economic factors. Third, 
use of PVAR approach makes us free to determine the dependent variable for which there is no 
consensus is reached until date. Fourth, we analysed the relationship between Tax and PS by 
using some economic control variables (variables used are Government effectiveness, hereafter 
GE; Freedom of corruption, hereafter FC; Gross Domestic Product, hereafter GDP) and finally 
we tested the relationship between behaviour of GE, FC and GDP.  
 
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of literature; Section 3 
presents the empirical specification and the data description; Section 4 provides the results of our 
work; and Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The literature in the field of the relationship between tax level and political stability are relatively 
poor. On the one hand, there are authors who claim that the level of taxation determines the 
political stability, but on the other hand, others researchers state that the political stability 
determines the level of taxation.   
The level of taxation determines the political stability. For Feng (1997) and Bell (2001) the 
political stability is the consequence of a strong taxation power that cares about the quality of life 
of people. Devereux and Wen (1998) started their research based on the connection between 
economic growth and size of government, and political instability respectively. Some of the 
results allow that the high tax of capital is associated with political instability. Carmignani (2003) 
explored the models in which the political instability affects several economic variables, such are: 
economic growth, budget formation, inflation, and monetary policy. He does not forget the 
taxation issue. His main results show that an increase in capital taxation for redistributive 
purposes reduces the investments in the legal system, determines policy myopia induced by 
political instability and uncertainty. One year after, analysing the issue of tax heaven, Palan 
(2002) found that the most successful tax havens have political and economic stability. 
Ghura and Mercereau (2004) focused the study on Central African Republic. They analyse the 
relationship between trade and taxation, on the one hand, and political climate, on the other hand. 
Using an econometrical investigation instrument, they found that the turbulences in the level of 
trade and low tax revenues could generate chances of political environment; more precisely these 
factors can propagate political instability.  
Nkurunziza (2005) treats both high tax rates and political instability. The main results of his 
investigation allow that during a period of economic meltdown high tax rates and political 
instability force the taxpayers to go in underground economy or to leave the government taxation 
system. Collier (2009a, 2009b) provides quantitative arguments to assess the causes of political 
instability. His hypothesis is that economic opportunities are the main causes of civil wars. In 
some cases, as Estrada (2011) shows, political instability depends on a weak state presence in the 
territories and the power of guerrilla insurgents. In most countries depend mainly on the fiscal 
challenges of hybrid between the stability conditions and political instability. 
Several years after, Elgin (2010) demonstrated the hypothesis that confirms the connection 
between tax level and political stability. The author’s model involves that countries in which the 
political turnover is high, the level of tax burden is low. 
The political stability determines the level of taxation. Cukierman et al. (1992) study the issue 
of tax reform. The tested model used cross-sectional data for 79 countries. Based on the main 
results, the authors consider that countries with a more unstable and polizared political system 
have an inefficient tax structure. Moreover, the political instability is positively connected with 
the seigniorage.  
Volkerink and De-Haan (1999), applying panel data analysis on a large sample of OECD 
countries for the period 1965-1995, investigate the relationship between tax structure and 
political climate. He found that the political and institutional variables do not have any significant 
impact on the shape of the tax structure. The other part of analysis shows that an unstable regime 
has a higher tax burden. For Bohn (2002), the political instability causes myopic government 
behaviour and high debt levels, but it does not lead to an increase in inflation taxation, as in 
Cukierman, et al. (1992) has sustained. 
Aizenmana and Jinjarak (2008) focused on the efficiency of tax collection in their study and 
found that the efficiency of tax collection is affected by the greater polarization and political 
instability. More precisely, the reduced political stability determines a low efficiency of tax 
collection. Azzimonti (2010) explored the effect of political instability. The author emphasised 
that a rise in the level of political instability generate an decrease of the level of resources (i.e., 
taxes) available to next period’s policymaker, restricting in this way the spending of local public 
good. Melo (2011) studied the connection “tax level - political stability” in the case of Argentina, 
using “transaction cost politics” and Brasilia for comparison. He concludes that an explaining for 
low taxation in Argentina is political instability. In this case, the systemic political instability 
affects the tax behaviour of governments. 
Rieth (2011) considers the hypothesis that higher political instability leads to an increase of the 
tax rate on capital income. The author tested this idea using a panel approach, with annual 
observations for 13 OECD ies, for the period 1964 - 1983. The main finding shows that an 
increase of the index of political instability determines an increase of the tax rate on capital. 
 
A simplified Graphic 1 can show the variation between taxation and political stability. The full 
table identifies four types of political stability related to four types of taxation. This likewise 
reduces the space of four types of analysis to political stability: without political stability but low 
tax (for example Somalia and Congo-Kinshasa), without stability but high tax (Kazakhstan, Iran, 
and Colombia), with political stability and high tax (Norway, Japan), and with political stability 
but low tax (Jamaica, Belgium).  
 
Graphic 1: The variation between taxation and political stability 
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The location in any of the four quadrants makes a powerful difference to the character of the 
prosecutor and the public policy of a political regime. The conditions correspond to forms of 
taxation prevailing in each quadrant: (1) Without stability with high taxation - with conditioning 
of civil liberties, public opinion subordinate large budget for state military forces, the regime 
changes depend on conflicts between élite or a rebellion from below; (2) Without stability, low 
taxation - the state has no presence throughout the country, paramilitary groups occupy 
peripheral areas of the country, fighting between insurgent groups and displacement of civilians, 
many paramilitaries organizations are vying for political power in the localities; (3) With stability 
and high taxation - the civil liberties permanent social mobility, the difference between political 
parties, respect union rights, democratic opposition and competitive elections, control of private 
expressions of violence, low levels of political violence; and (4) With stability and low taxation - 
similar to regimes with high capacity and stability of taxation, social movements, frequent 
mobilization of political parties, formal consultations (including elections), but low effectiveness 
of tax control and greater involvement of actors in public policy illegal, deadly violence selective 
and high crimes. 
 
The literature regarding the connection between tax level and political stability allows that there 
are two directions of the relationship: “tax level first and political stability second” (the level of 
taxation determines the political stability), and “the political stability first and tax level second” 
(the political stability determines the level of taxation). Whatever is the direction of these 
connections; the considered variables can have the same sign or a different one. Moreover, even 
if operate such investigations, there are few of them that treat this connection under some 
economic or non-economic factors.  
 
3. Empirical methodology 
 
We use a panel-data vector autoregression methodology. This technique combines the traditional 
VAR approach, which treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with the panel-data 
approach, which allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity. We specify a first order VAR 
model as follows: 
       ttciitit d εµ +++ΖΓ+Γ=Ζ − ,110
                                              (1) 
 
where zt is either a two variable vector (Tax and PS or FC and PS or GDP and PS) or five-
variable vector (Tax, PS, GE, FC and GDP) or four- variable vector (GE, FC and GDP) and the 
variables are as defined previously (Appendix, Table I). We use i to index countries (Appendix, 
Table II) and t to index time, τ are the parameters and ε is white noise the error term. Further to 
calculate the impulse-response functions which describe the reaction of one variable to the 
innovations in another variable in the system, while holding all other shocks equal to zero we 
need to decompose the residuals in a such a way that they become orthogonal as the actual 
variance–covariance matrix of the errors is unlikely to be diagonal. The usual convention is to 
adopt a particular ordering and allocate any correlation between the residuals of any two elements 
to the variable that comes first in the ordering.1 The identifying assumption is that the variables 
that come earlier in the ordering affect the following variables contemporaneously, as well as 
with a lag, while the variables that come later affect the previous variables only with a lag. In 
                                                            
1
 The procedure is known as Choleski decomposition of variance-covariance matrix of residuals and is equivalent to 
transforming the system in a “recursive” VAR for identification purposes. See Hamilton (1994) for the derivations 
and discussion of impulse-response functions. 
other words, the variables that appear earlier in the systems are more exogenous and the ones that 
appear later are more endogenous.2  
 
In our specification, we assume that current shocks to the PS have an effect on the 
contemporaneous value of tax revenue, while tax revenue has an effect on the PS with a lag. We 
believe this assumption is plausible for two reasons.  
 
First, the tax level is a direct result of political vector action and depends only by the flexibility of 
tax system and legislative timing. In this case, the elector’s votes have an indirect effect on 
taxation. Second, the political environment is controlled with lag by tax level, which is one of 
most important info-economical factor in the collective choice. In this last situation, we note that 
the electoral tax feedback is strongly connected with the timing of electoral cycle. 
 
We set three objectives particularly in our study. First, we attempted to compare the response of 
tax burden to PS of bivariate to case when model includes five variables. Second analyze and 
compare the response of GDP to PS (i.e., bivariate case) and response of GDP to PS, tax burden, 
GE and FC (a case when model includes five variable). Third, we also analyzed the behaviour of 
response of GE, FC and GDP model which do not includes Tax and PS.  
 
In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, we need to impose the restriction that the 
underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit. Since this constraint is likely to be 
violated in practice, one way to overcome the restriction on parameters is to allow for “individual 
heterogeneity” in the levels of the variables by introducing fixed effects, denoted by µi in the 
model (Love and Zicchino, 2006). Since the fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to 
lags of the dependent variables, the mean-differencing procedure commonly used to eliminate 
fixed effects would create biased coefficients. To avoid this problem we use forward mean-
differencing, also referred to as the ‘Helmert procedure’ (see Arellano and Bover, 1995). This 
procedure removes only the forward mean, i.e., the mean of all the future observations available 
for each country-year. This transformation preserves the orthogonality between transformed 
variables and lagged regressors, so we can use lagged regressors as instruments and estimate the 
coefficients by system GMM.3 Further, our model also allows for country-specific time dummies, 
tcd ,  which are added to model (1) to capture aggregate, country-specific macro shocks that may 
affect all countries in the same way. We eliminate these dummies by subtracting the means of 
each variable calculated for each country-year. Further, to analyze the impulse-response functions 
we need an estimate of their confidence intervals. Since the matrix of impulse-response functions 
is constructed from the estimated VAR coefficients, their standard errors need to be taken into 
account. We calculate standard errors of the impulse response functions and generate confidence 
intervals with 500 Monte Carlo simulations.4 Finally, we also present variance decompositions, 
which show the percent of the variation in one variable that is explained by the shock to another 
                                                            
2
 More formally, if a variable x appears earlier in the system than a variable y, then x is weakly exogenous with 
respect to y in the short run. 
3
 In our case the model is “just identified”, i.e. the number of regressors equals the number of instruments, therefore 
system GMM is numerically equivalent to equation-by-equation 2SLS. 
4
 In practice, we randomly generate a draw of coefficients of model (1) using the estimated coefficients and their 
variance covariance matrix and re-calculate the impulse-responses. We repeat this procedure 1000 times (we 
experimented with a larger number of repetitions and obtained similar results). We generate 5th and 95th percentiles 
of this distribution which we use as a confidence interval for the impulse-responses. 
variable, accumulated over time. The variance decompositions show the magnitude of the total 
effect. We report the total effect accumulated over the 10, 20 and 30 years.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
We estimate the coefficients of the system given in (1) after the fixed effects and the country time 
dummy variables have been removed. In Table 1, we report the results of the model with two-
variable vector (Tax and PS, FC and PS and GDP and PS). In panel 1 of Table 2, we report the 
model of five-variable vector (GDP Tax, PS, GE, FC and GDP) and in panel 2 of table we report 
the results of the three-variables vector (GE, FC and GDP). Finally, Table 3 and Table 4 report 
the results of variance decomposition. Further, we present graphs of the impulse-response 
functions and the 5% error bands generated by Monte Carlo simulation. Fig. 1, 2 and 3 reports 
graphs of impulse responses for the model with two variables, while Fig. 4 reports impulse-
response functions of five variables and the 5% error bands generated by Monte Carlo simulation. 
In order to see sensitivity of the results we excluded the tax and PS variables and plots of 
impulse-response functions with of three variables case and the 5% error bands generated by 
Monte Carlo simulation are presented in Fig. 5. 
 
Table 1: Results of a two-variable VAR model  
Response of Response to 
 Tax(t-1) PS(t-1) 
Model 1: Tax and PS 
Tax(t) 0.65927699 (3.592873)*** 0.01776941 (0.23756994) 
PS(t) -0.01802554 (-0.05706872) 0.7265211 (3.0192047)*** 
Model 2: FC and PS 
 FC(t-1) PS(t-1) 
FC(t) 0.8186223 (3.3256258)*** 0.05595704 (0.65369876) 
PS(t) 0.01965007 (0.0541893) 0.73079369 (20.410429)*** 
Model 3: GDP and PS 
 GDP(t) PS(t) 
GDP(t) 0.69183174 (9.3432619)*** 4.395e+09 (0.65729474) 
PS(t) -1.105e-13 (-0.15751507) 0.74070339 (2.7464966)* 
Two variable VAR model is estimated by GMM, country-time and fixed effects are 
removed prior to estimation. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing the 
row variables on laggs of the column variables. Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics 
are in parentheses. *** , ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation   
 
It is evident from the model 1 of Table 1 that response of tax to PS is positive but insignificant in 
terms of estimated coefficient however, response of PS to tax is negative but this is also 
insignificant in terms of estimated coefficient. Response of tax and PS to themselves is positive 
and significant.  Similarly, response of FC and PS to themselves is positive and significant in 
terms of estimated coefficient however, response of FC to PS and PS to FC is positive but 
insignificant (and negligible in case of PS to FC) in terms of estimated coefficients in both cases. 
Model 3 show that response of GDP to GDP is positive but insignificant in terms of estimated 
coefficients and response of PS to PS is positive and significant in terms of estimated coefficient. 
Response of GDP to PS is positive while response of PS to GDP is negative however; estimated 
coefficients of both cases are insignificant.  
 
Next, we present results of the relationship among five variables of our interest in panel 1 of 
Table 2 and their sensitivity of dynamic relationship among FC, GE and GDP is presented in 
panel 2 of Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Results of a Five-variable and Three-variable VAR model 
Response 
of 
Response to 
 Tax(t-1) PS(t-1) GE(t-1) FC(t-1) GDP(t-1) 
Panel 1: Tax, PS, FC, GE, and GDP 
Tax(t) 0.6886671*** 
(5.2738666) 
0.00387733 
(0.07739613) 
0.0550709 
(0.03186126) 
-0.02411885 
(-0.401493) 
-2.766e-14 
(-0.1072374) 
PS(t) -0.05051866 
(-0.15964162) 
0.74966387*** 
(3.8510976) 
-0.38436068 
(-0.05906699) 
-0.00742575 
(-0.051763) 
-1.750e-13 
(-0.4606695) 
GE(t) -0.00456843 
(-0.55303369) 
0.00206191 
(0.32549224) 
0.89030224*** 
(3.9261383) 
0.00261014 
(0.69725982) 
1.645e-14 
(0.38352893) 
FC(t) -0.06066337 
(-0.255812) 
0.09097436 
(0.65771337) 
2.5051433 
(0.48151517) 
0.70338689*** 
(5.1800124) 
1.031e-13 
(0.16376026) 
GDP(t) 1.070e+09 
(0.24405784) 
-5.121e+08 
(-0.10957263) 
-8.748e+10 
(-0.55690429) 
-2.246e+09 
(-1.144209) 
0.69328497*** 
(9.4382726) 
Panel 2: FC, GE, and GDP 
 GE(t) FC(t) GDP(t)   
GE(t) 0.82543233*** 
(3.9169541) 
0.0056157 
(0.60381247) 
1.423e-14 
(0.3080674) 
  
FC(t) -1.0655629 
(-0.27895739) 
0.61516889* 
(2.0404792) 
-1.337e-13 
(-0.22457988) 
  
GDP(t) -7.104e+10 
(-0.40651321) 
-2.891e+09 
(-0.41960763) 
0.69390085*** 
(8.5114831) 
  
Five and three variable VAR model is estimated by GMM, country-time and fixed effects are 
removed prior to estimation. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing the row 
variables on laggs of the column variables. Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *** , ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation   
 
It is evident from the both panels of Table 2 that response of Tax, PS, FC, GE, and GDP to only 
them is positively significant in terms of estimated coefficient. It is evident from panel 1 that 
response of Tax to PS and GE is positive but insignificant in terms of estimated coefficient and 
response of Tax to FC and GDP is negative and insignificant in terms of estimated coefficient. 
Response of PS to all other three variables is negative but insignificant in terms of estimated 
coefficient.  Response of GE to every variable is positive except for Tax however, it is significant 
in terms of estimated coefficient for all variables except for itself. Results of FC are very similar 
to the GE. Response of GDP is positive for itself and Tax while negative for PS, GE, and FC and 
significant only for itself in terms of estimated coefficient.  
If we see Panel 2 of Table 2 we find that response of GE to GE, FC and GDP is positive but 
significant in terms of estimated coefficient only for GE and hence this finding is similar to the 
findings of five-variable case. Further, response of FC is positive to itself and negative to GE and 
GDP but significant in terms of estimated coefficient in case of itself and hence in this case also 
our findings of five variable model is not sensitive to the exclusion of the Tax and PS variables. 
Finally, we have similar results of the relationship among GDP, GE and FC in case of three 
variable model and five variable model.   
The variance decompositions for the different models, presented in Table 3, are in line with these 
results.  
 
Table 3: Variance decomposition of a two-variable VAR model  
Model Tax PS 
Model 1: Tax and PS 
Tax 0.98911587 0.01088413 
PS 0.00042509 0.99957491 
Model 2: FC and PS 
 FC PS 
FC 0.98542776 0.01457224 
PS 0.00765671 0.99234329 
Model 3: GDP and PS 
 GDP PS 
GDP 0.76359804 0.23640196 
PS 0.0047603 0.9952397 
Percent of variation in the row variable (10 periods ahead) explained by 
column variable. 
Source: Authors’ calculation  
 
Tax explains, in model 1, about 99% of variation 10 periods ahead in itself while only 1% is 
explained by PS while PS explains about 100% of variation 10 periods ahead in itself. In model 
2, FC explains about 99% of variation 10 periods ahead in itself while only 1% is explained by 
PS while PS explains about 100% of variation 10 periods ahead in itself. Model 3, show that 
about 76% of variation 10 periods ahead is explained by GDP in itself and 24% is explained by 
PS while PS explains about 100% of variation 10 periods ahead in itself. 
Next in Table 4 we present the variance decomposition of model contains all five variables and 
sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of Tax and PS.  
 
Table 4: Variance decomposition a Five-variable and Three-variable VAR model 
Variable Tax PS GE FC GDP 
Panel 1: Tax, PS, FC, GE, and GDP 
Tax 0.96965472 0.00069825 0.00240558 0.02722765 0.0000138 
PS 0.00076803 0.99443189    0.0042787 0.00044334 0.00007804 
GE 0.03919617 0.06048736 0.86374144 0.03626451 0.00031053 
FC 0.02521807 0.06072712 0.12400332 0.79000777 0.00004372 
GDP 0.04545642 0.05061542 0.38459291 0.10074347 0.41859177 
Panel 2: FC, GE, and GDP 
 GE FC GDP   
GE 0.89417083 0.10562547 0.0002037   
FC 0.00881963 0.99114438 0.00003599   
GDP 0.19299306 0.14606802 0.66093893   
Percent of variation in the row variable (10 periods ahead) explained by column variable. 
Source: Authors’ calculation  
 
 
Its is evident from panel 1 of  Table 1 that Tax explains, in this case also a very high percentage 
of variation (i.e., 97%) 10 periods ahead in itself while FC explains more than 2% and rest is 
explained by PS, GE and GDP. Interestingly, PS explains about 99% of variation 10 periods 
ahead in itself and rest 1% is explained by other four variables. Further, GE explains 86% of 
variation 10 periods ahead in GE, PS explains 6%, and Tax and FC each of them explains 3% of 
variation. In case of FC, 79% of variation is explained by FC itself and 12% is explained by GF, 
2.5% and 6% is explained by tax and PS. Finally, in case of GDP, GDP explains around 41%, 
10% is explained by FC, GE explains 38%, Tax and PS explains 4.5% and 5% variation 10 
periods ahead.  
Now if we look panel 2 of the table we will find that GDP explains 66%, GE explains 19 and FC 
around 15% of variation in GDP. Further, in case of FC around 100% of variation is explained by 
FC only. Finally, in case of GE, 10 periods ahead 89% of variation is explained by GE itself and 
11% is explained by FC. Hence, we find almost same results on the relationship among GE, FC 
and GDP even after excluding Tax and PS from the system.  
Next, we present the IRFs of our bivariate models analyzed above. Figure, 1 shows that response 
of tax to tax though positive but declining over period and tax to PS is almost zero through the 
period. Similarly, response of PS to tax is marginally negative while response of PS to PS is 
positive but declining throughout the period.  
 
Figure 1: Tax and PS 
 
 
 Figure 2 shows that response of FC to FC and to PS is positive but it is declining over period in 
case of FC only. Response of PS to FC is almost zero while response of PS to PS is positive but 
declining throughout the period.  
 
Figure 2: FC and PS 
 
 
Figure 3 show that response of GDP to GDP and to PS is positive but it is declining over period 
in both cases. Similar holds for response of PS to GDP and to PS.   
 
Figure 3: GDP and PS 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4 show that response of tax to tax though positive but declining over period and tax to PS 
and GDP is almost zero through the period while response of Tax to FC is negative. Response of 
PS to tax is marginally negative while response of PS to PS is positive but declining throughout 
the period. Response of PS to FC and GDP is almost zero while response of PS to PS is positive 
but declining throughout the period. 
 
Figure 4: Tax, PS, GE, FC and GDP 
 
 
Response of GE to PS, GE, FC and GDP is positive while it is negative for Tax. Response of FC 
to Tax is negative while it is positive for other variables. Response of GDP to PS, GE and FC is 
negative but marginally positive in case of tax and highly positive in case of GDP.   
It is evident from figure 5 that response of GE to GE is positive but over period it is declining. 
Response of GE to FC and to GDP though positive but not very high and it is close to zero.  
 
Figure 5: GE, FC and GDP 
 
 
Response of FC to GE and GDP is close to zero while to FC though positive but decline over 
period. Response of GDP to GE and FC is marginally and constantly positive through the 10 
years while response of GDP to itself is though positive but declining over period.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
The present study is, in particular, an attempt to test the relationship between Tax and PS by 
using some economic control variables and to see the relationship among the GE, FC and GDP. 
For the purpose, we used the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach in the panel framework 
because of its advantages in that it assumes all variables as endogenous contrary to the previous 
studies. For analysis, we used country-level panel data from 59 countries for the period 2002 to 
2008.  
 
Study finds that response of tax to tax is positive but to PS and GDP is almost zero throughout 
the period while tax to FC is negative. However, response of PS to tax is marginally negative but 
response of PS to PS is positive throughout the period. Response of PS to FC and GDP is almost 
zero while response of PS to PS is positive throughout the period. Response of GE to PS, GE, FC 
and GDP is positive while it is negative for Tax. Response of FC to Tax is negative while it is 
positive for other variables. Further, we find that response of FC to FC and to PS is positive and 
response of PS to FC is almost zero. Response of GDP to PS, GE and FC is negative but 
marginally positive in case of tax and highly positive in case of GDP.   
 
The proposed analysis helping to make distinctions between the political instability experienced 
but maintained high taxation, and those states with political stability but with a low taxation. The 
few variables that are used in the model and its reduction to a two-way relationship are one of its 
merits, when compared with other models used in similar studies. The model also contains a 
simple explanation for a complex problem: measuring the taxation power and its relations with 
political stability, and vice versa, to measure political stability based on taxation (Estrada, 2010) 
notes. The model results are not linear, but rather their function within the system variables with 
a relative strength (Tax, PS, GE, FC and GDP). Political stability can be a good predictor of tax 
stability, although not the only key factor. It is possible to suggest on the basis of these results 
that the political and institutional stability determines the conditions of economic risk and civil 
war, divisions between parties and violent conflict, so typical in countries with political 
instability. 
 
Based on this approach, the model helps to explain the causes of political instability. The salient 
features of this model are: (a) simplicity is based on a limited number of variables (five) are 
categorical or continuous and not dependent on complex interactions or nonlinear effects. (b) 
accuracy: a low level of errors, the model achieves a high percentage of accuracy in 
distinguishing countries with inclination to political instability, compared to countries with 
political stability, (c) generality: the model allows to distinguish types of political instability, both 
resulting from acts of violence and failure of democracies to show, and (d) novelty: the model 
incorporates a tool that helps evaluate and exclude many variables used by the conventional 
literature. This approach is mainly based on the recognition of state structures and the relations 
between elites and parties.  
 
It is possible that during the first manifestations of political instability has no explicit relationship 
with taxation. However, the model presented in this paper allows us to observe their occurrence 
within more or less irregular intervals. Most variables and suggested conditions observed in other 
models such as taxation affects the stability, but do so less able to predict the onset of political 
instability and its impact on institutions. While the effects of massacres, assassinations and forced 
displacement are important to detect instability, taken as a categorical measure of political 
institutions, it is by far the most powerful factor distinguishing the time fiscal stability and tax 
time political instability. Indeed, once we can take into account the characteristics of the political 
regime studied, a majority of economic, political and social countries in the sample taken, they 
have a significant impact on the relative instability in the short term. In our view, this conclusion 
moves our study focusing on this field, with the goal of attention from problems of tax and fiscal 
power to the institutional foundations of political instability (Buchanan and Brennan, 1990; and 
Snyder and Mahoney, 1999). From the political point of view, these results suggest a return to the 
Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan, 1990). Many of the factors that other studies have found 
related to taxation and the fiscal power to the civil wars and violent conflicts, the per capita 
income, physical geography, population size, longevity and the provision of basic resources. 
Aspects that are outside of timing term public policy. The most influential factor in this model, 
however, is the institutional nature of tax systems and the susceptibility of reform policies. 
 
At the same time, the model also suggests that the tax reform process can often contain political 
instability. Previous research has shown that transitions to democracy often go through 
intermediate regimes. This work has shown that there is a variety of political instability, partial 
democracies with tax systems of low or high income (Hammar et al., 2008). In a majority of the 
unstable political regimes of low tax risk is evident. Taxation, as noted, may have indirect 
relationships with political instability in complex regimens (Bischoff and Gohout, 2010). In any 
case, when institutions are subordinated to radical struggles between factions or political parties, 
the tax is at risk of being godless by taxpayers or the sensors are installed in revenue, ready to 
devour the budget (Blomquist and Micheletto, 2006). Then, the corrections made to the fiscal 
policy effects are not always assertive on the general policies of public spending. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table I: Variables and their sources 
 
Variable Source 
Tax - Tax in GDP (%) World Bank online data-set, World Development Indicators (WDI) from 1960 to 2010 
PS - Political stability (years) Polity™ IV Project Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2009 Dataset 
GE - Government effectiveness 
(2.5 maxim quality points) 
World Bank online data-set, Aggregate Governance 
Indicators, 1996-2009 
FC - Freedom of corruption (100 
- no corruption) The Heritage Foundation 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product in 
US Dollars 
World Bank online data-set, World Development 
Indicators (WDI) from 1960 to 2010 
 
 
Table II: List of analyzed countries 
 
Countries Latvia Estonia Portugal 
Australia Lebanon Finland Romania 
Austria Lesotho France Russia 
Bangladesh Lithuania Georgia Singapore 
Belarus Mali Germany Slovenia 
Belgium Mauritius Ghana South Africa 
Bulgaria Moldova Greece Spain 
Canada Mongolia Guatemala Sri Lanka 
Chile Morocco Hungary Sweden 
Croatia Nepal Indonesia Trinidad Tobago 
Cyprus Netherlands Israel Uganda 
Czech Republic Norway Italy Ukraine 
Denmark Peru Kazakhstan United Kingdom 
Egypt Philippines Kenya United States 
El Salvador Poland Kuwait Uruguay 
 
 
